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BOOK REVIEWS

Living without Free Will by Derk Pereboom. Cambridge University Press,
2001. Pp. Xxiii and 231. $54.95.
GORDON PETTIT, Western Illinois University

Living without Free Will is an expansion of "Determinism al Dente" (Nous,
vol. 29, 1995, pp. 21-45). Pereboom provides a sustained defense of hard
incompatibilism-the position that freedom of the sort required for moral
responsibility is incompatible with determinism and any type of indeterminism that is likely to be present in our world.! He argues that current scientific evidence gives us good reason to believe that factors beyond our control produce all of our actions, and therefore we are not morally responsible
for anything. Living without free will is not as bad as it may seem; we may
have to give up some significant beliefs about ourselves, but morality and
human values remain largely intact. Our coming to tmderstand the limitations of our capacities and the consequences of these limitations will bring
about a net benefit. Consequently, our philosophical reflections need not
lead us to recommend practicing a form of self-deception for the greater
good of humanity. Pereboom's new book is well informed, creative, and
fills a gap in writings on freedom and moral responsibility. It will give
those interested in the topic much food for thought.
Pereboom displays insight into the many nuances of recent discussions of
conditions of moral responsibility (Chapter One). He gives a modest
endorsement of Frankfurt-style arguments, but claims that the core incompatibilist claim-that moral responsibility requires indeterminism at some
point in an agent's causal history-is unscathed by Frankfurtian arguments.
Though he rejects an alternative possibilities requirement for incompatibilist
freedom, his argument for this claim is tentative and he acknowledges that a
robust priIlciple of alternative possibilities (PAP) including an historical
component may not have a counter-example (p. 25). While recognizing the
weaknesses remaining even in recent Frankfurt-style examples, he follows
the lead of John Martin Fischer and argues that they ultimately refute the
PAP due to the lack of robustness of alternatives that may be present in these
examples.2 This position will leave some incompatibilists unsatisfied, since it
allows for the possibility that alternatives are necessary for moral responsibility, even if an explanation of why they are necessary is undeveloped.
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Pereboom criticizes two forms of libertarianism in Chapters Two and
Three. First, he argues that freedom grounded in event causation is incoherent due to the force of a regress argument. He develops a version of a
familiar argument against libertarianism. An agent could not be responsible
for her first choice, since this would be caused by a series of events over
which she had no control. But a second choice would fair no better since it
is caused by a series of events that she could not have been responsible for,
and so on. The only way to avoid the regress argument is through an
account of agent causation, which of course has also met serious criticism.
Pereboom takes the unique position that agent causation is coherent and
possibly true, but empirical considerations cause significant doubt that we
have free will of the type an agent-causal view requires. Though he refrains
from claiming that agent-causal theorists have successfully provided a
robust account of agent causation, he claims there is "logical space" for their
basic claims to be true, and regress arguments fail to show that agent causation is incoherent. Pereboom argues that if we actually had agent-causal
powers of the sort necessary for moral responsibility, it would require the
existence of some form of strong emergentism (5E) or non-physicalism.
Thus if there is moral responsibility, either 5E or non-physicalism is true.
Pereboom considers and rejects arguments of Jaegwon Kim in opposition to
an 5E of a kind that may allow for agent causation. 3 He then proposes a
Kim-like argument that concludes 5E is unlikely, though possible, and
without a tangential discussion of the vast literature on the topic, he
assumes that non-physicalism is possible. Thus, moral responsibility and
agent causation are possible, but the libertarian must give an explanation of
how agent causation fits in with empirical data. The proponent of agent
causation has three options: 1) attempt to show how agent causation may
be reconciled with science by a Kantian argument that assumes determinism, 2) attempt to show how agent causation may be reconciled with science, assuming indeterminism, or 3) attempt to show that agent-causes may
exist even if this implies some deviations from expected findings given our
current science. The last approach assumes that agent causation may produce statistical divergences from quantum probabilities that would be
expected if no agency influenced the relevant events. (It is not clear why the
agent-causal theorist must commit to one of the three options.)
Pereboom's best case is made for the failure of the first option. A weaker case is made for the failure of the second option, and an unsatisfactory
case is made for the failure of the third option. The structure of the argument against the third option is that of an argument from ignorance: since
there is no evidence from chemistry, psychology, or biology for statistical
divergences of the type agent causation would produce, we should conclude that agent causation does not exist. The most significant problem
with this argument is that there is no known method for attaining data that
would confirm the presence of the minor divergences required for agent
causation, so it is implausible to say that a lack of positive empirical evidence disconfirms it. Our knowledge of neurophysiology and human
behavior at the level required to identify statistical divergences related to
quantum theory is far too limited to make a successful argument from
ignorance. We simply do not yet know how to find information relevant
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to agent causation. Without the resources of science to confirm or disconfirm agent causation, we must rely on our humanistic beliefs such as our
belief in moral responsibility (which, we are assuming, implies the existence of agent-causation and which Pereboom admits is a nearly universal
belief and hard to divest of) in order to make a judgement on the existence
of agent causation. Pereboom claims that it is not acceptable to count a
belief in moral responsibility as evidence for agent causes (p. 86). But
when science is at a stage where no evidence can be found confirming or
disconfirming an hypothesis, it is rational to appeal to beliefs outside of science in order to draw conclusions about the plausibility of the hypothesis.
Pereboom considers and rejects two common approaches to compatibilism while continuing to build a case for hard incompatibilism in
Chapter Four. Extending the work of others, he presents a strong case
against one approach to compatibilism, a Humean/Strawsonian strategy
that concludes determinism is irrelevant to responsibility. The second
approach to compatibilism considered is a "causal integrationist"
account developed in various ways recently by Harry Frankfurt, John
Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza jointly, and R. Jay Wallace (among
others). In addressing this approach, Pereboom's claims may be overstated; he argues that a progression of cases (revised from "Determinism
al Dente") rules out compatibilism of this type. The cases are worthy of
further attention, and the details will need to be examined and discussed
more carefullv before a fair verdict can be rendered on their success or
failure.
"
In a chapter focusing on practical application (Chapter Six), the implications of hard incompatibilism for dealing with criminals are developed in a
way that does not shy away from recommending great changes in our
legal system. Retributive punishment of any kind, capital punishment,
and most prison terms are ruled out by hard incompatibilism. Still,
Pereboom claims that rehabilitation and preventive detention are consistent with hard determinism and could be all that is needed in a well-functioning judicial system.
What may be Pereboom's most significant challenge for the general
audience of this journal comes with his reflections on hard incompatibilism, morality, and the meaning of life (Chapters Five and Seven). While
equanimity in accepting the divine will is palatable for most believers (as
initially described in Pereboom's "Stoic Psychotherapy in Descartes and
Spinoza," Faith and Philosophy, 11 (1994), pp. 592-625), a rejection of our
concepts of guilt, repentance and forgiveness is more difficult to accept.
Pereboom does not address how rejecting these notions may have ramifications for one's religious beliefs. Since guilt, repentance and forgiveness
are crucial components of the Christian Gospel, his conclusions force a radical revision of the Christian faith-a revision unwarranted in light of the
arguments presented.
Living without Free Will deserves careful attention by anyone concerned
with freedom and moral responsibility. The well-developed case for hard
incompatibilism and the consideration of its implications provide good
reason to become familiar with this work.
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NOTES
1. Pereboom assumes throughout the work that there are various types of
freedom, and specifies what type of freedom he is discussing in various contexts.
2. See John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: All Essay 011 Control
(Cambridge Mass Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 140-141, "Recent Work on
Moral Responsibility," Ethics, vol. 110 (1999), pp. 93-139, and in Fischer and
Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), pp. 100ff.
3. The arguments he considers are largely from Jaegwon Kim,
Supervenience and Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free Will
Theists by John B. Cobb JI. and Clark H. PilIDock, eds. Grand Rapids,
Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000. $26.00.
LEWIS S. FORD, Old Dominion University
Process theists follow Whitehead in requiring that their theology be adequate in the sense that every item of experience, including the findings of
science, can be interpreted in terms of their philosophy. Free-will theists
have a rather different notion of adequacy in mind: it must be adequate to
Scripture as broadly interpreted within the evangelical tradition.
Although starting from such diverse perspectives, they have much in
common. In particular both endorse what is known as "open theism," that
God does not know future contingents, not because there is some peculiar
limit on divine omniscience, but because future contingents are simply
unknowable per se. God knows the actual as actual, the possible as possible, but not the possible future as if it were already in some sense determinately actual.
Traditional treatments of omniscience attempt to preserve immutability.
God's knowledge could only be immutable if it were already completely
determinate. Such traditional accounts assume that God must be complete
and fully self-sufficient to be perfect. That is the proper meaning for a perfect being. Process theism sees God as becoming, and therefore adopts a
different standard of perfection: that which, no matter how great, can
always be further enriched. Open theists recognize the extent to which
God is portrayed as temporally engaged, facing an indeterminate future.
David Griffin and William Hasker, whose contributions frame the volume, explore the differences. One concerns creation ex nihilo. This is not in
the first instance the cosmological question about the beginning of the
world, although process theists need to take more seriously than they have
the claim by astrophysicists that time and the world began with the Big
Bang. It is more the question whether God can be complete and self-sufficient alone, or whether God requires some sort of world as a source of novelty and enrichment. It also concerns divine power, as pure persuasion
does not appear able to explain creation ex nihilo.

